2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-30-2012

USA v. James Mabry

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"USA v. James Mabry" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 516.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/516

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1621
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES MABRY,
a/k/a JAMES YOUNG,
a/k/a MANNY,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cr-00120-001)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 28, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 30, 2012)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
James Mabry, proceeding pro se, appeals the order of the District Court denying his
motion to modify his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). For the following reasons, we
will affirm.
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I.
In May 2005, James Mabry pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania to possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of
crack cocaine.

Over Mabry’s objection to application of the career criminal sentencing

guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the District Court imposed 210 months of incarceration. See
United States v. Mabry, M.D. Pa. No. 04-cr-00120.
Since his sentencing, Mabry has challenged his conviction and sentence via numerous
collateral attacks pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), despite a waiver provision in his plea agreement. In January 2012, Mabry
filed another pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) . The District Court
appointed counsel, who then moved to withdraw, stating that Mabry had been sentenced based
on the career offender guidelines. The District Court denied Mabry’s motion; he then filed a
timely pro se notice of appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s decision to
grant or deny a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c) for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).
III.
Mabry argues that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) in light of
Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Amendment 750 retroactively altered the
offense levels in § 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines relating to crack cocaine. Section
3582(c)(2) provides that, “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
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imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment,” upon
consideration of certain factors.
Mabry’s sentence was based on his status as a career offender. Although Amendment
750 would reduce his base offense level, it does not ultimately alter the guideline range under
which he was sentenced, § 4B1.1. In Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155, we explained that Amendment
706 1 did not affect the application of the career offender offense level under § 4B1.1.
Under Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010), a court must first
determine if a sentence reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines
before it considers whether reduction is warranted.

Section 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) disallows

sentence reductions where an Amendment does not lower a defendant’s applicable Guideline
range. As a career offender, Mabry’s applicable Guideline range remains unchanged. Thus,
the rationale of Mateo bars his claim, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Mabry’s motion.
Mabry also argues that he is entitled to a reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(2)
because the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced his offense level as a career offender.
However, the Fair Sentencing Act change to the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses
does not apply retroactively to defendants who committed their crimes and were sentenced
before its enactment. See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 113-15 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Amendment 706 lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses under
§2D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines by two levels.

3

Accordingly, any difference in the penalty cannot change Mabry’s offense level and cannot
serve for him as a Guideline change that is a basis for a reduction of sentence under
§ 3582(c)(2).
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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